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RESEARCH NOTE 
Unions and Non-union Bargaining A,g~ents under th~e 
Etnploy01ent ~Contracts A~ct 1991: an Assessment aft~er 12 
Months 
Peter Boxall and Peter Hayn~es* 
This paper records a study of the impacts of ,the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
(ECA) on unions and non-union bargaining agents.. The assessment primarily relates ,to the 
first 12 months of the Act's op,eration but, where appropriate, does extrapolate certain trends 
into the foreseeable future. Both trade unions and non-union agents (alternative worker 
agents and employer agents) are discuss,ed. 
Introduction 
As Mitchell (1989) reminds us, it is imponant to see the Australasian model of 
conciliation and arbitration as comprising two central pillars - a judicial system of dispute 
~esolution (compulsory arbitration) and a system of union recognition through official 
registration. New 'Zealand's retreat from this model has been conducted over approximately 
the last 30 years (Boxall, 1990, 1991). Prior to the Employment Contracts Act 1991, 
however, the retreat was almost exclusively associated with refonns of the law on bargaining 
(i.e. dispute resolution). The Industrial Relations Act 1973 gave official blessing to a dualistic 
system of awards and collective agreements. Then, in the context of ~major practitioner 
frustration with various unsatisfactory centralised wage controls, the fourth Labour 
Government abolished the process of compulsory arbitration in 1984. That Government 
affn1ued its commitment to direct wage bargaining in the Labour R~elations Act 1987 but 
attempted to refo1m the second tier. The arbitral structure of trade union rights, however, 
remained largely intact Unions retained a troika of important legislative supports- exclusive 
jurisdiction, blanket coverage and (in essence) compulsory membership. The Employment 
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Contracts Act 1991 completes the deconstruction of the arbitration system by targeting this 
troika. Employee representation is now entirely contestable and bargaining structure entirely 
negotiable. How the Employment Contracts Act affects the traditional activities of trade 
unions and the ways in which it is used by non-union agents is an important subject for study. 
This article assesses the Act's impacts on these groups afier 12 months of operation. 
'Research methodology 
In-depth interviews were held with selected officials of 18 trade unions segmented 
across the manufacturing and construction, private sector services and public sectors (Table 
1 ).. The interviewees were Auckland-based district secretaries. Often, certain other officials 
(e . g .. , senior organisers) were involved in the interviews. The sample was designed to fairly 
represent the three main sectors of the economy and to reflect a balance of large, small, 
affiliated and non-affiliated unions. The total national membership of the unions studied 
represented 55% of total New Zealand union membership at December 1991 and thus we 
believe the sample can be regarded as fairly representative of trade union views and trends. 
Two officials of the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZCfU) were also interviewed 
on union structural changes. 
In-depth interviews were also held with 8 non-union bargaining agents (Table 2). The 
objective here was to study the impacts of the .Act on the traditional e.mployer agent, the 
employers association, and a cross-section of alternative agents. As we shall see, most of the 
alternative agents work on the employer side of the table. Besides the General Manager of 
the Auckland Employers' Association, inteiViewees were sole proprietors or principals in their 
fnms. 
• 
The impact of the ECA on trade unions 
·General impact 
The union officials were asked to indicate what proportion of their pre-ECA 
membership had signed new bargaining authorizations. We were interested in the extent to 
which the ECA had affected membership levels. Data analysis showed that the unions 
surveyed could be split into two groups: 
(1) those significantly affected by the ECA 
(2) those unions affected mainly by ~economic festructuring since 1984 and 
marginally (if at all) by the ECA. 
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Table 1: Unio,ns studied 








NZ Engineering ,& Rela~ed Trades' Union 
Electrical Workers' Union 
United Food & ~Chemical Workers' Union 
Northern Combined Apparel Union 
Auckland & Tomoana Freezing Works' Union 
Building Trades' Union 
Bakers Trade Employees' Union 








Service Workers' Union 
Northern Distribution Union 
Finance Sector Union (Finsec) 
NZ Journalists & Gtaphic Process Union (Jagpfo) 
NZ Nurses' Union 
Society of Technicians, Administrators and Supervisors (ST AMS) 
Association of Professional, Executive Salaried Staff (APEX) 
Public Sector 
* NZ Public Service Association (PSA) 
* Northern Local Government Officers' Union 
* Post Office Union 









Table 2: Non-Jmion t~genfs studied 
Auckland Employers' Association 
Teesdale Meuli & Co 
Wheeler Campbell Labour Markets Ltd 
Hesketh Henry 
Haigh Lyon & Co 
Russell E M Hodge ,& Associates Ltd 
Judith Collins & Associates 
Garry Pollak 
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The unions in the frrst category were mainly located in the less skill~ed private sector 
s·ervices and had clearly benefitted from exclusive jurisdiction, compulsory membership and 
blanket coverage under the old system. Their membership losses after 12 months of the Act's 
operation appear to be in the region of 20 to 40%. Unions in the second category were 
mainly located in manufacturing, construction and the public sector. Their membership bases 
had been seveliely affected by the redundancies associated with economic restructuring and 
~ecessionary downturns since 1984, but their members, with certain exceptions., had ren1ained 
loyal since the introduction of the ECA. These unions, one should point out, were either 
voluntary before the ECA (in the public sector) or did not depend on compulsory membership 
to any great degree. Unions whose workplace organisation efforts were ~effective, which 
allocated resources to delegate training and which involved themselves in enterprise issues 
beyond the traditional concerns of collectiv~e bargaining have clearly been much less a.fiected 
by the ECA (to date). Some unions, it must also be emphasised, claim rising density levels 
since the E~CA. 
The general picture, then, is one of a significant fall in union density but largely as 
a result of major losses amongst the unions that did depend on the supports of the old system. 
These unions are largely loca~ed in the secondary labour mar~et. The historical unions remain 
strong in their traditional primary labour market domains but face something of a challenge 
from the emergence of new enterprise unions and less fot•••al employee groupings engaged 
in direct contracting with their employers. This challenge may well grow and thus 
complacency would be unwise in any part of the union movement. 
Major challenges 
Our interviews involved ~extensive discussion of reasons for changes in membership 
levels and of factors that many commentators predicted would affect the unions under the 
ECA. Data analysis suggests the unions have faced three main challenges: 
(i) The major downward shift in the structure of private sector bargaining 
The private sector unions have had to cope with a major shift to enterprise bargaining . 
. Although there have been certain important exampl~es of multi-employer bargaining, the new 
system is primarily based at enterprise, establishment and individual levels. Those unions 
already well entrenched at the enterprise level have had little trouble adapting. Others have 
largely withdrawn to serving only their significant sites. Those with a majority of scattered 
members in small sites or in peripheral worker groups on larger sites hav~e been severely 
affected. 
(ii) Patte~n-breaking employe~s 
With the major shift to enterprise bargaining, a range of ~employer behaviour has 
emerged. Broadly speaking, we believe ~employers can be ~clustered into three groups. The 
frrst group has stuck with the basic pattern of employment relations in the industry (eith~r 
because they are basically happy with it or because they are not particularly innovative 
employers). This group tends to work in a non-threatening way with the traditional unions 
and/or a committee of employees to reach reasonable, if unspectacular., deals. Some relativ~ely 
minor changes to work practices may be sought in exchange for a small pay increase or a 
Unions and Non-union Bargaining Agents 227 
stable pay structure but nothing is attempted that significantly disrupts the basic pattern of 
employment relations. Where, however, these employers have perceived multi- occupational 
unionism as a problem in the past, they are quite often ~encouraging the unions to fotm a 
single table or rationalise their coverage so that a single or dominant union emerges. The 
other two groups are both significant pattern breakers. 
One group is engaging in a strategy of improved direct relationships with the 
workforce based on greater ~consensualism and involvement. This was a trend amongst cenain 
employers before the Act and it seems to have gained impetus under it Many of these 
employers have made :significant progress with total quality management (TQM) and believe 
that their employee relations policies must reflect more mutuality and less adver:sarialism .. 
Various innovative practices seem to be emerging here including greater use of perfotmance-
based pay within job ranges, a new intefiest in productivity gainsharing and a bargaining 
stance based on a good first offer from the employer (mther than on a traditional oft:er of 
nothing or an offer of clawbacks). The latter appears to be a New Zealand application of what 
the Americans call Boulwarism (see, for example, ~Capelli (1990)). We should ~expect further 
experimentation from these employers as they learn which practices work best in their specific 
context (as Streeck (1987) argues occurs in such situations). These employers constitute a 
threat to those unions which are ambivalent towa~ds g~~eater worker participation in 
management or whose fo1n1s of engagement with management are restricted to a narrow band 
of traditional concerns. Where these employers do succeed in establishing a higher trust 
environment over the long run (and by no means all of them will stay the distance)., then ·there 
is a challenge to those unions which fail to remain relevant in some important way to the 
workers concerned. 
The second group of pattern breakers, regrettably, is involved in overt fotms of anti-
unionism, in some cases with illegality. The anti-union stance is generally associated with 
harsh bargaining. Included here are certain small to medium-sized employers intent on 
denying access to union officials and convinced that proprietorship giv~es them a right to 
impose their absolute will on an intimidated workforce. ~One of the worst instances involv~es 
an employer requiring the workers to repudiate union membership (in writing) as a condition 
of entering into a new contract. This, of course, is illegal under the Employment ~Conttacts 
Act but it seems that some employers have assumed the Act provides carte blanche for a 
stance of doctrinaire anti-unionism and barsh bargaining. Unlike the group of high trust 
~employers just mentioned, these employers are not interested in greater employee 
involvement, but simply in the emphatic assertion of management prerogative. This 
behaviour, surely, will only perpetuate a cycle of bad industrial relations and bring 
commercial consequences as labour turnover and industrial disputation rise in the foreseeable 
future. Besides certain smallish ~employers, our research also indicates that certain large 
(often foreign-owned) corporations have used the ECA as an opportunity to pursue anti-union 
practices. With a limited number of exceptions, our respondents did not attribute such an 
attitude to New Zealand-owned ~corporations or to the traditional New Zealand manager where 
a certain pragmatic acceptance of the role of effective trade unionism is considelied to be 
more the noun. 
(iii) Worker direct bargaining 
A third challenge comes to the historical trade unions from the growth of worker 
direct bargaining. The trend to date is "at the margin" but it may well grow in significance. 
Certain ~oups of workers have resigned from their historical unions to pursue direct 
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contracting with their employers. Of the contracts lodged to date with the Secretary of 
Labour, approximately 20% involve some forn1 of employer/employee contracting without 
traditional union involvement (Contract, Vol.2, May 1992: 2}. 
The reasons being ci~ for the disaffection include a belief that the unions have done 
too little for their membership fees in the past, a feeling of alienation from wider trade union 
politics, the beli~ef that they will achieve better bargaining outcomes than those recommended 
to them by their union officials or a fundamental agreement with the employer that certain 
changes which the unions have opposed are in fact sensible and fair in the specific ~company 
context The rise of worker and delegate power implied by the new framework does have 
serious implications for trade union structures - an important subject to which we return 
below. 
To summarise this section, then, it is clear that the change in bargaining structure 
brought about by the E,CA and the ongoing impact of economic liberalisation since 1984 has 
passed the strategic initiative in labour relations from the historical trade unions to employeiS 
and, in some cases (but probably increasingly), to the workforce itself. W~e must emphasize 
that the wofds chosen here are important - the initiative has passed not to the employer 
organisations but to the employers. Employer organisations and lobbyists have played a 
critical role in the refotrn of labour market regulation since 1984 but the effect of the refotms 
has been to place the initiative in the hands of individual employers. 
And opportunities? 
Tempt,ed as the unions may be to see the ECA as a total disaster, there is an old 
Eastern proverb about crises presenting opportunities for those with the ability to discern 
them. It might be said that the ECA has had certain positive impacts on the unions. 
First, in many situations, the ECA has made free riding a more dangerous activity. 
Workers who took the benefits of awards without contributing fees now face the possibility 
of exclusion from a collective whose strength they may actually need to obtain and defend 
reasonable wages and conditions. This helps to account for the rising level of union density 
on certain sites. 
Second, those employers who have been exhibiting harsh bargaining behaviours have 
often driven groups of workers back into the anns of the unions. Not only in certain parts 
of the private sector, but also in the state sector, harsh bargaining postures are stiffening the 
liesolve of various worker groups to resist certain kinds of employer initiative and 
strengthening union organisation. 
Third, as in the United States (Capelli, 1990), the unions afe becoming increasingly 
adept at media campaigns, customer boycotts and shareholder challenges at AGMs that are 
designed to shame anti-union employers and harsh barg,ainers. Those employers who haven't 
thought of the link between their industrial relations practices and their product market image 
are particularly vulnerable. 
Fourth, the general public perception of trade unions may well be improving as 
voluntary unionism shifts the basis of union legitimacy from historical registration to worker 
choice. Unions, in effect, are seen to have a right to exist based on the free decision-makipg 
of the workforce. That commands greater public respect than compulsion. 
Finally, the ECA does challenge the unions to reconsider their strategies. Some unions 
appear to be simply punchdrunk. Others, how,ever, seem to be engaged in a serious appraisal 
of their policies and objectives. Union surveys of member attitudes are growing. One union 
• 
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has gone through a robust process of strategic planning in which individual political 
objectives seem to h-ave been put to one side and members extensively surveyed on their 
needs. generating a healthy pfocess of self-criticism and goal setting for the future. Unions, 
it might be suggested, may be starting to employ more of the strategic management concepts 
and techniques traditionally used by the larger businesses. In the United States, unions which 
do adopt worthwhile strategic planning processes are more proactive and appear to enjoy 
increasing membership bases (Stratton & Brown, 1988). Unions that do not plan strategically 
are more likely to have declining membership and to be pursuing mergers to stave off 
collapse.. An interesting study could be launched in New Zealand to see if the same trends 
can be observed here. 
In summary, then, although the unions live in *'dangerous times" there are nonetheless 
opportunities and new horizons. We tum now to a more detailed discussion of the trends in 
union structure (which is intimately connected to the question of strategy just discussed) .. 
Trends in union structure 
The changed legal framework, along with the impact of ~economic resnucturing since 
1984, has created two distinct and essentially ~conflicting pressures in respect of union 
structure. The frrst is well recognised: the pressure for amalgamation of union structures in 
Olider to take advantage of ~economies of scale and (generally speaking) to ~create a more 
efficient foiin of industry-based unionism. However, the second pressure - to decentralise 
union structures and power in response to decentralised collective bargaining- is difficult to 
reconcile with the pressure to amalgamate. Some unions are finding that creating or 
maintaining a large structure in the face of this new pressure is an inherently difficult process. 
They are discovering that with the loss of compulsory membership and exclusive jurisdiction, 
there is a real risk of losing certain ~oups of members who feel remote - geographically 
and/or politically- from those making deals on their behalf. In the new environment, the real 
power must be in the branches, and branch officials must be seen to be serving the 
membership's needs and not some wider political agenda. Larger, industry-based unions are 
clearly a sensible response in the new environment but pose risks where the grassroots feels 
distanced from decision-making . 
As discussed above, there are instances where union members have resigned because 
(amongst other reasons) officials have been perceived as poor perfoitners or have 
recommended that members accept a contract that they feel they don't have to. Although it 
must be stressed that membership loss of this type from established trade unions has been 
relativ.ely limited to the present time, it seems that a large number of small enterprise or 
micro-industry unions may become a fixture of the new industrial relations landscape. 
At the same rime, a number of small historical unions continue to guard their 
autonomy jealously and are unwilling to succumb to the economic pressure to merge with a 
large union. The continued existence of a number of small, fiercely independent unions is 
likely to reinforce the dichotomisation of worker interest organisations into a 11elativ·ely small 
number of large industry-based unions or union federations and an array of smaller micro-
industry and enterprise-based unions. 
The implications of these trends for the central worker organisation., the NZCfU, are 
difficult to anticipate. It should also be noted in this respect that a number of unions and 
union officials continue to feel alienated from wider trade union politics and evince no 
immediate desire to participate. These trends, taken together, must nec~essarily pose real 
problems for any future attempts at centralised wage fiXation. 
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The impact of the ECA on non-union agents 
The employer side of the table 
We tum now to an examination of the Act's impacts on non-union agents. The frrst 
thing that must be said is that all the evidence strongly suggests that most of the business is 
on the employer side of the tabl~e. The market for employer advocacy and representation, 
given the decentralisation of private sector bargaining, has expanded enotn1ously. 
The new employer agents can be divided into two main groups: 
(1) innovative, practitioner-oriented consultants who are quite often helping to 
facilitate a more consensual, direct employer-employee engagement, 
(2) lawyers who are involved in advising their clients on contract contents and in 
litigation before the Employment Tribunal and Court. 
The first group tend to be experienced in labour relations, prepared to run with new 
ideas in the new environment, capable of focusing on the needs of the individual employer 
and not connected to wider employer politics. Their approach seems to be increasingly 
popular amongst these employers looking for something different to what they perceive as 
"traditional conflict-ori~ented IR". As with the workforce, there are employers who don't want 
to be part of wider politics: they simply want to run a good ship . The growth of these 
alternative agents- given the blend of fresh ideas and credible experience they tend to bring-
is a healthy development. We ·must stress, however, that their approaches do vary and the 
market will inevitably become more discerning as employers travel up the learning curve 
associated with enterprise-based labour relations. 
The impact of the second group, it seems, is much more ambiguous. Many 
respondents made strong criticisms of "new kids on the block" lawyers. Some lawyers, it 
seems, are not well briefed on labour law .. Others seem to have adopted the kind of 
adversarial approach which ~expands conflict (for example, escalating ~cases to litigation which 
would be more appropriately settled infotmally in an ongoing employment relationship). Y~et 
others seem to be taking a strict, legalistic approach to contract construction which amounts 
to poor employee relations advice because it demoti.vates, if not completely alienates the 
employee. Some legal advice is clearly not sensible business advice. On the other hand, 
respondents tell us there are lawyers - perhaps mostly the "old pros" who were around before 
• 
the ECA - who do have a reputation for proffering legal advice which also makes business 
sense. Again, the market is learning fron1 its experience and some sort of "shake-out" 
amongst law practitioners may well be occurring. 
Where does all this leave the traditional employer agent - the employer association? 
The ~employers' associations, arguably, are just as afiected by the ECA as any of the ttade 
unions. The demise of blanket award coverage and the politics of the wage round has created 
a whole new ball game . There are clear signs of a new strategic direction emerging in the 
employers' associations, one which places more ~emphasis on consultancy, education and 
training and infonnation services. Such a strategic shift - in an increasingly competitive 
environment - cannot, of course, be achieved overnight, especially in organisations with a 
strong tradition in the fonner system. As with the CIU, we must await further developments . 
• 
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The worker side of the table 
As indicated earlier, there is much less business on the worker side of the table. Trade 
unions are still generally the most cost-effective option in tern1s of worker agency needs and 
the best unions bring a mnge of advantages in tetms of contract enforcement, industry 
experience and supplementary member services (such as health centres). Alternative worker 
agents, like the employer ones, can be divided into two main groups: 
( 1) former union officials setting up in competition to trade unions, 
(2) lawyers largely involved with personal ,grievances and contract advice. 
It seems that the frrst group- fotmer union officials - is meeting with mixed success. 
One or two agents have reportedly already ~established quite sizeable businesses while others 
may well be living off scraps. Certain essentially employer--oriented agents are also receiving 
requests from worker groups for bargaining services and this may well grow as particular 
individuals acqu~e a reputation for high effectiveness. It may well be that certain of the 
worker groups now pursuing direct bargaining with their employers are keen to "shop around" 
for the best advice and services and are thus more than willing to ,consider non-traditional 
sources of help. The impact of the second group is again ambiguous. Certain lawyers are 
taking worker grievances on a contingency basis but the level of competence in texrns of 
labour relations expertise and judgment is clearly variable. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, a number of points are worth emphasising: 
(i) Unions - to date - hav,e not been equally affected by the Employment Contracts Act. 
For those unions most dependent on the historical supports of the old system, the 
consequences have naturally been greatest. The rest of the unions tend to have been 
more affected by economic restructuring and recession than by the ECA. And those 
unions whose workplace organisation efforts have been effective, whose resources 
have been allocated to delegate training and support and which have involved 
themselves in enterprise issues beyond the traditional concerns of collective bargaining 
have been much less aft:ected by the ECA. There is no cause for complacency 
anywhere in the union movement, however. 
(ii) The unions have been facing certain jmportant ~challenges. These include the 
challenges posed by the decentralisation of private sector bargaining, the initiatives of 
pattern-breaking employers and the growth of worker direct bargaining. 
Pattern-breaking employers can be divided into two main groups: those pursuing high 
trust direct relations, and those indulging in anti-unionism and harsh bargaining. The 
stra~egic initiative in labour relations has passed to employers and, in some cases (but 
probably increasingly), to the workforce itself. 
(tii) The Act has bad some positive impacts on the unions. These include the fact that free 
riding is made more dangerous, that harsh bargaining has backfired on cenain 
employers, that PR ~campaigns against anti-union employers have proved quite useful, 
that the public perception of unions seems to be improving and that the new 
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environment may well be encouraging strategic planning. 
(iv) The new environment has brought two essentially conflicting pressures in tetnls of 
union structure. One is towards greater size and (generally speaking) industry-based 
structures, the other towards greater decentralisation of resources and power.. While 
the larger unions grapple with this tension, a number of smaller ones wish to remain 
autonomous and there is an incipient movement towafds enterprise and micro-industry 
• 
unions. 
(v) In tettns of non-union agents, most of the business is on the employer side of the 
table. New employer agents can be divided into innovative, practitioner-oriented 
consultants and lawyers mainly involved in legal advice and litigation. The frrst group 
has been associated with much of the innovation in labour relations styles. The 
impact of the second group has so far been ambiguous. 
(vi) There is ·much less business available to alternative work!er agents because trade 
unions are still generally the most cost-effective option in tettns of wor~er agency 
needs and the best unions bring a range of advantages in ·retms of contract 
enforcement, industry experience and supplementary member services. 'The main 
players to date are fott.ner union officials and lawyers. The impact of both groups is 
so far variable. 
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